Dutch ‘FONOPS’ in Asia?

The Royal Netherlands Navy in the Indo-Pacific: Strategic necessity or outdated geopolitical overreach?

Subic Bay, 25 January 2026

Introduction

The presence of the Royal Dutch Navy in Asian waters is consistently presented by the Dutch government as a principled defense of the international legal order.
In a time of increasing rivalry between the United States and China, this course raises pressing questions. Is the deployment of scarce military resources in the Indo-Pacific an effective contribution to stability, or does the Netherlands unintentionally serve as a pawn in a great-power conflict over which it has little influence?

What are FONOPS?

FONOPS (Freedom of Navigation Operations) are maritime operations primarily conducted by the United States to assert the right of free passage in international waters. These operations often occur in disputed areas, such as the South China Sea, where China lays maritime claims that, according to many Western states and legal experts, are inconsistent with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

UNCLOS stipulates that coastal states exercise sovereignty within their territorial sea up to twelve nautical miles, while freedom of navigation applies beyond that. FONOPS aim to prevent precedents where excessive claims become normalized through silent acceptance.

The South China Sea is crucial for global trade. Estimates vary, but according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), approximately $3.4 trillion in trade passed through this area in 2016, amounting to about 21% of global trade value. Recent analyses suggest this share remains stable, with roughly 25–40% of worldwide maritime trade by tonnage, depending on the source (e.g., IMO or World Bank). These routes, including the Strait of Malacca, are vital for the Netherlands as a trading nation.

Historical Dutch involvement in Asia

The Netherlands has a long maritime history in Asia. The establishment of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) in 1602 marked the beginning of large-scale Dutch presence in the region. The VOC combined trade with military power and exercised de facto control over various coastal areas and sea routes in East and Southeast Asia.

“The Island of Desima, Residence of the Dutch in Japan…” Copper engraving of the island of Dejima published by Isaac Tirion around 1740

A well-known example is Dejima, the artificial island near Nagasaki, where the Netherlands had exclusive access to Japan as the only European power during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This history underscores that Dutch involvement in Asia was traditionally strongly economically driven and accompanied by geopolitical ambitions.

In the twentieth century, the Netherlands also sought global maritime relevance. The proposal by Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Luns in the 1950s to establish a large naval base in Netherlands New Guinea illustrates this ambition. International pressure and regional power shifts, however, ended this effort, revealing the limitations of Dutch power politics.

The current role of the Netherlands

The Netherlands does not have an explicit FONOPS doctrine but does participate in multilateral operations that are similar in nature. Examples include missions aimed at enforcing UN sanctions against North Korea, with Dutch naval vessels operating in international waters in East Asia.

The Dutch government emphasizes the legal character of this deployment: supporting international law and multilateral agreements. Proponents argue that such missions contribute to global stability, deter expansionist behavior, and protect trade routes.

Critics, however, point to the close alignment with U.S. strategic objectives. They argue that the Netherlands is thereby unnecessarily drawn into great-power competition, with increased risks of diplomatic tensions and military incidents, particularly with China.

The incident with HNLMS Tromp

In June 2024, the Dutch frigate HNLMS Tromp patrolled international waters of the East China Sea as part of a multinational mission enforcing UN sanctions against North Korea. During this mission, Chinese combat aircraft repeatedly circled the ship, and a Dutch NH90 helicopter was approached by Chinese planes.

The HNLMS Tromp (foreground) is pictured in a joint exercise with a Japanese destroyer on Tuesday. Photo: Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force

The Netherlands classified these actions as potentially unsafe, while China described it as a provocation and characterized its interceptions as professional and legitimate. The incident illustrates how quickly military operations in practice can escalate into political confrontation.

Chinese counter-reactions and symmetrical maneuvers

China increasingly responds to Western maritime presence with its own demonstrations of power. For example, the Chinese navy conducted exercises in early 2025 in the Tasman Sea, near Australia and New Zealand, including live-fire drills. These actions demonstrate that China is capable and willing to project military presence far beyond its own region.

For smaller countries such as the Netherlands, such developments increase the risk of involvement in escalations far beyond their own borders.

Dutch plans for 2026

The Dutch defense budget will rise to approximately €26.9 billion in 2026, partly to meet the NATO guideline of 2% of GDP. A portion of this budget is allocated for international missions, including deployments in the Indo-Pacific.

The Netherlands intends to send another naval ship to the region and also deploy F-35 fighter jets, possibly in cooperation with Japan. This deployment fits within broader NATO and EU strategies but raises questions about priorities, proportionality, and strategic value.

Arguments for and against

Advantages of continuing this deployment include strengthening alliances and supporting the international legal order. Additionally, these missions provide operational experience for the Dutch armed forces.

Arguments against focus on increased escalation risk and limited direct security gains for the Netherlands. Moreover, the transatlantic relationship has been under pressure since statements by President Trump, and within Europe, there is growing demand for strategic autonomy. Economic vulnerabilities, such as disruptions in trade and technology sectors, make the Netherlands sensitive to political counter-reactions from China. Against this backdrop, the question arises whether limited resources could be more effectively deployed for European security.

Conclusion

Dutch maritime involvement in Asia calls for reconsideration. Limiting efforts to European defense and diplomatic engagement offers a more balanced and realistic course for Dutch ambitions.

 

List of main sources used

Ministry of Defence (NL) – Official statement on the incident with HNLMS Tromp (June 7, 2024)

NOS – Netherlands entangled in complicated situation in seas around China

Marineschepen.nl – Defense budget rises to nearly 27 billion; Indo-Pacific deployment 2026

Government of the Netherlands – National Defense Budget 2026 (PDF)

Rijksfinanciën.nl – Explanatory Memorandum 2026, Indo-Pacific policy priorities

Reuters – China’s defense ministry calls Dutch ship incident “heinous”

CNN – Chinese military harasses Dutch warship in East China Sea

Newsweek – China responds after fighter jets confront Dutch warship

The Aviationist – Detailed analysis of the interception of HNLMS Tromp

South China Morning Post (SCMP) – China warns against Dutch naval ‘intrusion’

The Japan Times – Interview with Dutch ambassador on F-35 mission in Indo-Pacific (2026)

CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) – How China views Freedom of Navigation Operations

RAND Corporation – U.S.–China Military Scorecard

Lowy Institute (Australia) – Chinese naval activity and Australian FONOPS

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) – official treaty text

Hillary Clinton (2011) – America’s Pacific Century, Foreign Policy

VOC trading post Dejima – https://inter-antiquariaat.nl/antiek/verkocht/dejima-tirion/